A significant threat to the recent, wide deployment of machine learningbased systems, including deep neural networks (DNNs), is adversarial learning attacks. The main focus here is on evasion attacks against DNNbased classifiers at test time. While much work has focused on devising attacks that make small perturbations to a test pattern (e.g., an image) that induce a change in the classifier's decision, until recently there has been a relative paucity of work defending against such attacks. Some works robustify the classifier to make correct decisions on perturbed patterns. This is an important objective for some applications and for natural adversary scenarios. However, we analyze the possible digital evasion attack mechanisms and show that in some important cases, when the pattern (image) has been attacked, correctly classifying it has no utilitywhen the image to be attacked is (even arbitrarily) selected from the attacker's cache and when the sole recipient of the classifier's decision is the attacker. Moreover, in some application domains and scenarios, it is highly actionable to detect the attack irrespective of correctly classifying in the face of it (with classification still performed if no attack is detected). We hypothesize that adversarial perturbations are machine detectable even if they are small. We propose a purely unsupervised anomaly detector (AD) that, unlike previous works, (1) models the joint density of a deep layer using highly suitable null hypothesis density models (matched in particular to the nonnegative support for rectified linear unit (ReLU) layers); (2) exploits multiple DNN layers; and (3) leverages a source and destination class concept, source class uncertainty, the class confusion matrix, and DNN weight information in constructing a novel decision statistic grounded in the Kullback-Leibler divergence. Tested on MNIST and CIFAR image databases under three prominent attack strategies, our approach outperforms previous detection methods, achieving strong receiver operating characteristic area under the curve detection accuracy on two attacks and better accuracy than recently reported for a variety of methods on the strongest (CW) attack. We also evaluate a fully white box attack on our system and demonstrate that our method can be leveraged to strong effect in detecting reverse engineering attacks. Finally, we evaluate other important performance measures such as classification accuracy versus true detection rate and multiple measures versus attack strength.
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Introduction
We are in the midst of a great era in machine learning (ML), which has found broad applications ranging from military, industrial, medical, multimedia/Web, and scientific (including genomics) to even the political, social science, and legal arenas. However, as ML systems are ever more broadly deployed, they become ever more enticing targets, for both individual hackers, as well as for government intelligence services, which may seek to "break" them. Thus, adversarial learning has become a popular topic, with researchers from both the security and ML communities devising various types of attacks and also defenses against those attacks. Focusing on statistical classification, prominent attack types include (1) data poisoning attacks on training data, with the typical goal of degrading a learned classifier's accuracy (Huang, Joseph, Nelson, Rubinstein, & Tygar, 2011; Miller et al., 2014; Xiao et al., 2015) , but more recently to create "back doors" (Chen, Liu, Li, Lu, & Song, 2017) ; (2) reverse engineering attacks, which seek to learn a nonpublic (black box/undisclosed) classifier's decision-making rule by making numerous (even random) queries to the classifier (Tamer, Zhang, Juels, Reiter, & Ristenpart, 2016; Papernot et al., 2017) ; and (3) test-time evasion attacks, wherein test (operational) examples are perturbed human imperceptibly, but in such a way that the classifier's decision is changed and now disagrees with a consensus human decision (e.g., Biggio et al., 2013; Szegedy et al., 2014; Goodfellow, Shlens, & Szegedy, 2015; Carlini & Wagner 2017b) . Such attacks, creating adversarial examples (Szegedy et al., 2014) , may, for example, cause an autonomous vehicle to fail to recognize a road sign or an automated system to falsely target a civilian vehicle. Early work in this area includes Biggio et al. (2013) and Szegedy et al. (2014) . Biggio et al. (2013) proposed to minimally perturb patterns so as to induce misclassifications, applied to support vector machine (SVM) classification of images and PDF files. Szegedy et al. (2014) considered deep neural networks, posed an attacker's constrained optimization problem seeking imperceptible image perturbations that induce misclassifications, showed that this approach is highly successful in creating adversarial examples starting from any (or, at any rate, most) legitimate images, and that these adversarial examples seem to transfer well (remaining as adversarial examples for other networks with different architectures and for networks trained on disjoint training sets). There are some related approaches for finding decision boundaries in neural networks that are much older (e.g. Davis & Hwang, 1997 ), but were not applied to create adversarial attacks.
that the given test pattern, though "closest" to a particular (authenticated or known) class, among all such classes, is "too anomalous" relative to the typical patterns seen from that class. Moreover, one is weighing the cost of false positives (invalid accesses) much higher than that of false rejections (invalid access denials).
Third, , Goodfellow et al. (2015) , and Carlini and Wagner (2017b) strongly assumed that the classifier structure and its parameter values are known to the attacker. Carlini and Wagner (2017a) refer to this as the "zero knowledge" case: while possessing full knowledge of the classifier, the attacker does not possess knowledge of any defense (e.g., attack detector) that may be in play. Addressing the case where the classifier is not initially fully known to the attacker, recent work has proposed techniques to reverse-engineer a (black box) classifier without necessarily even knowing its structure. Tamer et al. (2016) consider black box machine learning services, offered by companies such as Google, where, for a given (presumably big data, big model) domain, a user pays for class decisions on individual samples (queries) submitted to the ML service. Tamer et al. (2016) also demonstrate that with a relatively modest number of queries-perhaps as many as 10,000 or more-one can learn a classifier on the given domain that closely mimics the black box ML service decisions. Once the black box has been reverse-engineered, the attacker no longer needs to subscribe to the ML service. Moreover, such reverse engineering enables test time evasion attacks by providing knowledge of the classifier.
One weakness of Tamer et al. (2016) is that it considers neither very large (feature space) classification domains nor very large networks (deep neural networks (DNNs)); orders-of-magnitude more queries may be needed to reverse-engineer a DNN on a large-scale domain. A more critical weakness of Tamer et al. (2016) stems from one of its purported greatest advantages: the reverse engineering in Tamer et al. (2016) does not require any labeled training samples from the domain. 3 In fact, in Tamer et al. (2016) , the attacker's queries to the black box are randomly drawn (e.g., uniformly, over the given feature space). While such random querying is demonstrated to achieve reverse engineering, what was not recognized is that this makes the attack easily detectable by the ML service: randomly selected query patterns are very likely to be extreme outliers of all the classes. Each such query is thus individually highly suspicious by itself. Multiple queries should be easily detected as jointly improbable under a null distribution (estimable from the training set defined over all the classes from the domain). Even if the attacker employed bots, each of which makes a small number of queries, each bot's random queries should also easily be detected as anomalous, likely associated with a reverse-engineering attack.
Recently, reverse-engineering attacks based on more realistic queries have been proposed , leveraging some legitimate training data from the domain. However, the techniques developed here for detecting test time evasion attacks are also quite successful at detecting the reverse-engineering attack in Papernot et al. (2017) , as we have shown recently (Wang, Miller, & Kesidis, 2018) and also show here.
What is central to all three of these critiques is that some prior work does not consider the potential of a (purely unsupervised) anomaly detection (AD) approach for defeating the attack. While the likely effectiveness of AD to defeat Tamer et al. (2016) and even with noticeable salt and pepper noise, is clear, it is less clear such an approach will be effective against attacks based on small image perturbations, such as Goodfellow et al. (2015) and Carlini and Wagner (2017b) . This will be experimentally assessed in the sequel.
Defenses against Test Time Attacks: Robust Classification versus
Attack Detection. Irrespective of whether it is an AD or some other defense approach, until the past few years, there has been a relative paucity of work on defenses against test time evasion attacks. The basic premise and objective taken in some papers (Demontis et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017; Papernot, McDaniel, Wu, et al., 2016; Zantedeschi, Nicolae, & Rawat, 2017) is to robustify the classifier so that a test time pattern that is a perturbation of a pattern from class A is still assigned to class A by the classifier.
Robust classification in general is an important objective, especially in the face of "natural" adversaries-pattern variations induced by, for example, additive noise or transformations (image rotation, translation, and scaling). A common approach in training DNNs is data augmentation, with such pattern variants added to the training set so that the trained classifier is as robust as possible. However, the work of Demontis et al. (2017) , Wang et al. (2017) , (Papernot, McDaniel, Wu, et al., 2016) , Li and Li (2017) and Zantedeschi et al. (2017) does not focus on (or even consider) achieving robustness to natural adversaries but rather to (test time) adversarial attacks. These methods are all exclusively experimentally evaluated against adversarial attacks, not against natural adversaries. This is even true of Zantedeschi et al. (2017) , who use data augmentation to make the classifier robust. Demontis et al. (2017) modify the support vector machine (SVM) training objective to ensure the learned weight vector is not sparse. Thus, if the attacker corrupts some features, other unperturbed features still contribute to decision making. However, Demontis et al. (2017) may fail if only a few features are strongly class discriminating Li and Li (2017) perform blurring of test images in order to destroy a possible attacker's perturbations. Wang et al. (2017) consider DNNs for digit recognition and malware detection. They randomly nullify (zero) input features during both training and use and inference. This may eliminate perturbed features. There are, however, several shortcomings here. First, for the malware domain, the features as defined in Wang et al. (2017) are binary ∈ {0, 1}. Thus, nullifying (zeroing) does not necessarily alter a feature's original value, if it is zero. We suggest recoding the binary features to {−1, 1}. Now, nullifying (zeroing) always changes the feature value. This may improve the performance of the method in Wang et al. (2017) .
Second, there is a significant trade-off in Wang et al. (2017) between accuracy in correctly classifying attacked examples and accuracy of the classifier in the absence of attacks. As the nullification rate is increased, the frequency of defeating the attack increases, but accuracy in the absence of attack decreases. For the CIFAR-10 domain (Krizhevsky, 2010) , in the best case, onefourth of attack examples still cause misclassifications, with significant loss in accuracy absent the attack. Papernot, McDaniel, Wu, et al. (2016) , however, report a relatively small loss in accuracy in the absence of attacks, for their "distillation" defense strategy. For Li and Li (2017) we will investigate classification accuracy in the absence of attacks in our experimental results in the sequel. Graese, Rosza, and Boult (2016) show that some attacks are quite fragile and that even the process of image capture (involving cropping, for example) may defeat the attack. Image capture itself, assuming the attack is on a physical object, not an already captured digital image, may give robustness against adversaries.
"Don't Know" Response.
A fundamental limitation of the robust classification approach to test time evasion attacks taken, for example, in Wang et al. (2017) , Demontis et al. (2017), and Papernot, McDaniel, Wu, et al. (2016) concerns semantics of inferences. Consider digit recognition. Evasion resistance means that a perturbed version of "3" is still classified as a "3." This may make sense if the perturbed digit is still objectively recognizable, for example, by a human being, as an instance of a "3." In such case, it may be desirable to robustly classify this pattern as a "3." (It also may not be desirable, even in this case, to make such a decision: the decision may have no legitimate utility. We explain this in the sequel.) However, the perturbed example may no longer be unambiguously recognizable as a "3." Recall the perturbed digit examples from , with significant salt and pepper noise and other artifacts. For some of the published images in , "don't know" may be the most reasonable answer. We demonstrate such ambiguities in section 3.
Evasion-Attack Detection.
Moreover, irrespective of whether the perturbed pattern is class ambiguous, it may be operationally important to recognize that the classifier is being subjected to an evasion attack, irrespective of correctly classifying in the face of the attack. Once an attack is detected, preventive measures to defeat the attack may be taken-for example, by blocking the access of the attacker to the classifier. Also, human intervention or human consultation on a final decision or action can be invoked (Metzen, Genewein, Fischer, & Bischoff, 2017) . Moreover, actions that are typically made based on the classifier's decisions may be preempted or (conservatively) modified. For example, for an autonomous vehicle, once an attack on its image recognition system is detected, the vehicle may take the following action sequence: (1) slow down, move to the side of the road, and stop; (2) await further instructions. Similarly, a machine that is actuated based on recognized voice commands might be put into a sleep mode, under which it can do no damage. Similar conservative actions might be taken after attack detection in other application domains-for example, involving financial transactions or medical treatment. In a medical diagnostic setting, with an automated classifier either assisting human diagnosis or used for prescreening, one should not try to make a diagnosis based on an attacked or fabricated X-ray or MRI image. If one has the means to detect an evasion attack, one should do so prior to performing any diagnosis. If an attack is detected, a new image scan should be taken, with the diagnosis then made based on trusted image data. In Wang et al. (2017) , Demontis et al. (2017) , Papernot, McDaniel, Wu, et al. (2016) , and other papers, it is presumed that correctly classifying attacked test patterns is the right objective, without considering attack detection as a separate, important inference objective.
Analysis of Test Time Attack Mechanisms.
Beyond the arguments already given that detection is important in its own right, both operationally and in order to take risk-averse actions in some high-stakes applications, we also consider the problem formally. The following analysis is quite facile; however, it has not been given in any prior references of which we are aware. Specifically, let us simply recognize that there are only two digital attack mechanisms (see Figure 1) . 4 In one mechanism, there is an honest generator of an image, but the image is then intercepted and perturbed by an adversary (essentially, a man-in-the-middle attack) before being forwarded to the classifier. However, in the second mechanism, the adversary is the originator of the image. Here, the adversary may have his own cache of labeled, legitimate examples from the domain. He selects one (even arbitrarily), perturbs it to induce a desired misclassification, and then sends it to the classifier. 5 Only for the first mechanism, where there is a legitimate image, forwarded by an honest party who is interested in the classifier's Figure 1 : The two possible test time evasion attack mechanisms applied to digital images, with the attacker either an adversarial source of images directly or a man-in-the-middle, intercepting an image on its way to the classifier. In the former mechanism, the image itself may be of no legitimate interest and a possible decision recipient is the adversary. In the latter mechanism, the decision recipient could be the honest image generator, another intended recipient, or the adversary. decision, is it meaningful to try to correctly classify the attacked image. For the latter (adversarial source) mechanism, on an attacked image, the classifier's decisions are being made only for the possible benefit of the adversary. Moreover, even for the man-in-the-middle mechanism, it is not meaningful to make correct decisions if they are going to be intercepted only by the adversary on their way back to the honest generator (or to another intended decision recipient; see Figure 1 ). We thus conclude that if the image has been attacked, it is meaningful only to seek to correctly classify when there is an honest generator and when this honest generator (or another intended party) will be the recipient of the classifier's decision.
While this may be a common scenario, we expect the adversarial source is also a common scenario. However, even under the man-in-the-middle scenario, for the reasons already articulated, attack detection in high-stakes domains (e.g., security settings) is important, irrespective of the importance of making correct decisions. If no attack is detected, one can still make a best effort to correctly classify the pattern. This two-step process, with detection followed by classification when no attack is detected, is the structure of our proposed system (see Figure 2) . Finally, we note that a classifier may service multiple users, some legitimate and some attackers. Clearly, it is important to make correct decisions for legitimate users while at the same time detecting attackers. If the false detection rate of the system is set sufficiently low, our two-step process should be a practical solution in this multiuser setting.
There is one other important observation to make regarding Figure 1 . In particular, note that the man-in-the-middle attack is inconsistent with the common assumption made in the test time evasion attack literature Goodfellow et al., 2015; Carlini & Wagner, 2017a , that the attacker knows the ground-truth class label of the image he will perturb; if the test image is forwarded to him or intercepted by him, he has no way of knowing its ground-truth label. Assuming the attacker knows the classifier, he can perturb the image to ensure there is a change in the decision, but if the original image had been incorrectly classified, the attacker's perturbation could in fact lead to a correct classification rather than a (desired) misclassification. Thus, our identification of these fundamental attack mechanisms is pointing out a potential problem with the assumptions being made in many adversarial learning attack (and defense) papers (if the attack is actually a man in the middle).
Recent Work on Detection of Test-Time Evasion Attacks.
Over the past several years, there has been great interest in detecting test time evasion attacks, with a number of publications. However, the problem has not been motivated based on the arguments given here. One motivation, given in several works, including Carlini and Wagner (2017a) , is that robust classification of attacked images is difficult, while detection is easier. Certainly, given a robust classifier, one can easily construct a detector. Let the robust classifier's decision on image X beĈ r (X ). One can also design a standard (nonrobust) classifier, with decisionĈ s (X ), and then make detections when the two classifiers disagree. 6 Likewise, considering methods like that of Li and Li (2017) which "correct" an image X (for example, by blurring it), producing a new image X , one can build a single classifier and detect an attack whenĈ(X ) =Ĉ(X ). Although a robust classifier can be readily used in these ways to make detections, that does not mean this is a good approach for building a strong detector. We experimentally evaluate "detection via correction" based on Li and Li (2017) in the sequel and show that our direct design of a detector yields better detection and better classification performance (in the absence of attacks) than this strategy does.
Recent published work has in fact directly tackled the attack detection problem. Various detection approaches have been proposed, with a recent benchmark comparison study given in Carlini and Wagner (2017a) , evaluating a number of methods against the CW attack (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b) , which was demonstrated in Wagner (2017a, 2017b ) to be more difficult to detect than earlier attack methods such as those in Goodfellow et al. (2015) and . One strategy is to treat the detection problem as a supervised one, using labeled examples of known attacks. The resulting binary classifier (attack versus no attack) can then be experimentally evaluated on both the known attacks and unknown attacks. Examples of such systems include (Grosse, Manoharan, Papernot, Backes, and McDaniel, 2017) and the supervised approach taken in Feinman, Curtin, Shintre, and Gardner (2017) . However, Grosse et al. (2017) failed to detect the CW attack on the CIFAR-10 image domain (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a) . Feinman et al. (2017) similarly proved unsuccessful in detecting CW on CIFAR-10 (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a) . Li and Li (2017) also treated the problem as supervised, applying a multistage classifier, with each stage working on features derived from a deep layer of the trained DNN classifier. A detection is made unless all the stages decide the image is attack free. Carlini and Wagner (2017a) demonstrate that this detector performs very poorly on CW applied to both the MNIST and CIFAR-10 domains. Metzen et al. (2017) , who feed a DNN classifier's deep layers as features to a second neural net supervised detector, is more successful. However, the best results reported for this supervised method in detecting CW on CIFAR-10 were 81% true-positive rate (TPR) at a false-positive rate (FPR) of 28% (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a) . 7 Our unsupervised AD will be shown to significantly exceed these results. Moreover, Metzen et al. (2017) reported that training on some attacks did not generalize well to other attacks (treated as unknown). A related supervised approach is by Lu, Issaranon, and Forsyth (2017) , which quantizes deep-layer DNN features, feeding the resulting codes as input to a support vector machine detector. The authors argue that this quantization makes their approach resilient even to white box attacks (where the attacker has full knowledge of both the classifier and the detector) since gradients of their discriminant function are difficult to compute (or even zero almost everywhere). Again, this approach, being supervised, may not generalize well to unknown attacks.
Other approaches are unsupervised anomaly detectors, with some of these based on explicit null hypothesis density models for image features. One crude approach is simply to reject if the maximum a posteriori class probability (produced by the classifier) is less than a given threshold. Use of such "confidence" was shown to be effective for detection of a classifier's misclassified samples in Hendrycks and Gimpel (2017a) , although effective detection of adversarial attacks may require more powerful detectors. Another nonparametric approach is based on principal component analysis (PCA; Hendrycks & Gimpel, 2017b) . However, Carlini and Wagner (2017a) found that while successful on MNIST, this approach has esssentially no power to distinguish attacks from nonattacks on CIFAR-10. A more sophisticated, interesting nonparametric detector is Meng and Chen (2017) . Extending beyond PCA's linear representation, they extract nonlinear components using an autoencoding neural network. They use somewhat unconventional decision making, combining classification and detection. Images whose autoencoding-based reconstruction error is large (far from the nonattack image manifold) are detected as attacks. Images whose reconstruction error is small are sought to be correctly classified. However, given our earlier arguments, it may be desirable to make detections even when the attack is subtle, with the attacked image lying close to the image manifold. A primary concern with this detector is that it requires setting a number of hyperparameters (specifying the autoencoding network architecture, which in fact required different settings for MNIST and CIFAR-10, and softmax temperature variables). Setting hyperparameters in an unsupervised AD setting is difficult. If labeled examples of an attack are available, one can set hyperparameters to maximize a validation set measure. However, the attack is then no longer unknown and the detection method is actually supervised. Meng and Chen (2017) also incurs some degradation in classification accuracy in the absence of an attack-from 90.6% to 86.8% on CIFAR-10.
One explicit hypothesis-based detection approach is by Bendale and Boult (2015) . This approach computes the distance between a deep layer's class-conditional mean feature vector and the test image's feature vector and then evaluates this, under the null hypothesis of no attack, using a Weibull distribution. A few limitations of Bendale and Boult (2015) are that (1) it does not model the joint density of a deep layer (such a model would exploit more information than just the scalar distance), and it is not truly unsupervised, with several hyperparameters set by maximizing a validation measure that requires labeled examples of the attack. In our experiments, we will show that our purely unsupervised AD outperforms (Bendale and Boult, 2015) even though we (optimistically) allow their detector design to use more than 100 labeled examples of the attack to be detected.
More recently, Feinman et al. (2017) proposed a method based on a null hypothesis joint density model of a deep-layer feature vector. To our knowledge, theirs is the first such approach, and our detection methodology builds on it. Feinman et al. (2017) used a kernel density estimator to model the penultimate layer of a DNN. However, ultimately, they put forward a supervised method, learning to discriminate "attack" from "no attack," that leverages their density model to create the classifier's input features. They ultimately settled on a supervised method because their unsupervised detector did not achieve very good results. Carlini and Wagner (2017a) found that the unsupervised AD in Feinman et al. (2017) grossly fails on CW attacks on CIFAR-10: 80% of the time, attacked images had an even higher likelihood under the null model in Feinman et al. (2017) than the original (unattacked) images. Our unsupervised AD, developed in the next section, is based on a number of novel innovations beyond the basic null density modeling in Feinman et al. (2017) and will be shown to achieve substantially better results than this detector.
Contributions of This Work.
First, as already elucidated, we have identified not only scenarios and applications where attack detection is important but also attack scenarios for which, in the presence of an attack, robust classification is only for the benefit of the attacker, while detection remains an important objective. Second, we develop a novel unsupervised AD that models the joint density of a deep layer using highly suitable null hypothesis density models (matched in particular to nonnegative support for ReLU layers), exploits multiple DNN layers, and leverages a "source" and "destination" class concept, source class uncertainty, the class confusion matrix, comprehensive low-order density modeling (Qiu, Miller, & Kesidis, 2016) , and DNN weight information in constructing a novel decision statistic grounded in the Kullback-Leibler divergence. Third, we demonstrate state-of-the-art results on published attacks, including CW (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b) , compared against several benchmark detection methods and the results reported in Carlini and Wagner (2017a) . Fourth, we evaluate some performance measures of great interest that are sometimes not assessed in prior work, including multiple performance measures as a function of attack strength and classification accuracy versus the false-positive rate of attack detection. Fifth, we develop a novel white box attack, extending the approach in Carlini and Wagner (2017a) to attack a system consisting of a detector and a classifier, and evaluate this attack against our proposed system. Sixth, we show that our approach also yields a strong detector of the reverse-engineering attack from Papernot et al. (2017) .
Proposed Method: Anomaly Detection of Adversarial Attacks
2.1 Defender's Knowledge, Goals, and Assumptions. The defender is designed to detect test time evasion attacks and to correctly classify if no attack is detected (see Figure 2 ). The defender is proactive, with little prior knowledge about the attacker-simply that the attacker may have full knowledge of the classifier being used and, in performing attacks, will start from a legitimate image from the domain (from some class, c s ) that is correctly classified by the classifier, and seek to make small perturbations to the image, causing the classifier's decision to change from c s to another class. The changes should be small so that the attack is not easily detected by either a human or a machine (anomaly detector). The defender does not know whether an attack is present in a given image, and if one is present, does not know whether the attack is targeted (changing the decision to a specific targeted class c d ) or indiscriminate (Barreno, Nelson, Sears, Joseph, & Tygar, 2006) . The defender is unaware whether the attacker has any knowledge of the detector (even if the attacker knows a detector is being used). The defender does not specifically rely on the detector being unknown to the attacker. Even if the detector is known to the attacker, adding a perturbation to defeat both the classifier and the detector may be difficult or may require a high work factor or resources. However, the defender also recognizes the difficulty in devising a defense to defeat an attack that is truly a white box with respect to both the classifier and the detector (Meng & Chen, 2017) . The defender's goals are to achieve a high attack true detection rate (TPR) at a low attack false-positive rate (FPR) and high classification accuracy conditioned on no attack detected (with the detector set to achieve a low FPR). The defender's hypothesis is that even a small image perturbation inducing a misclassification is likely to result in a detectable signature in some of the DNN's (deep) layers. Our ADA approach is a novel detection framework built around this hypothesis. No strong restrictions on the defender's resources (offline training computation and memory, operational computation and memory) are assumed.
2.2 Attacker's Knowledge, Goals, and Assumptions. In most of our experiments (see section 3), we evaluate the published attacks in , Goodfellow et al. (2015) , and Carlini and Wagner (2017b) . These exploratory (Barreno et al., 2006) , test time evasion attacks are "white box" with respect to the attacker's knowledge of the classifier (Biggio & Roli, 2017) but "zero knowledge" (black box) with respect to the detector (Carlini & Wagner, 2017a) . That is, they exploit full knowledge of the classifier (to evaluate the classifier's decisions and compute gradients with respect to the classifier's discriminant function for creating perturbed images). They also exploit a cache of legitimate image examples from the classification domain of interest, with true class labels known. Thus, the attacker can perturb one of these images to induce a change to the classifier's decision and can verify that the change is a misclassification, based on knowledge of the true class label. 8 The attacks in , Goodfellow et al. (2015) , and Carlini and Wagner (2017b) are targeted, seeking to change an image with true label c s (that is correctly classified) into an image that is misclassified to a target class c d . A successfully attacked image means that a targeted misclassification was achieved using a small image perturbation. 9 The perturbation should be small so that the attack is not easily detected by either machine (an AD) or human perception. Even if the application does not involve human inspection, the attacker must still aim to evade an AD that may be deployed. A successful attack (a small perturbation inducing a misclassification) may still be detected by an AD. The attacker's cache could consist of the training images used to learn the classifier, but it also could be a separate data resource. The cache needs to be rich in that it possesses a sufficient number of examples from all classes. In this way, the attacker can produce targeted misclassifications from any starting class to any destination class. Further, it can produce many such attack examples by perturbing starting from many different images. The attacker's goal is to design an attack that achieves as high a success rate as possible.
In addition to evaluating these attacks that have no knowledge of the detector, in one experiment we also evaluate a complete white box attack, where the attacker possesses full knowledge of both the classifier and the detector. In this case, a successful attack is one that is "small," induces a misclassification, and is not detected.
Notation and Setup.
Consider a raw feature vector x ∈ R d , which could, for example, represent a (scanned) array of gray-scale values comprising a digital image. Consider an L-layer DNN. Let P DNN [C = c|x], c = 1, . . . , K be the a posteriori probability that x originates from class c, among the categories in a classification problem with K known categories. Without loss of generality, we represent these categories by the integers {1, 2, . . . , K}. There is a labeled training set X = {X (c) , c = 1, . . . , K}, where
Nc } are the labeled training samples from class c. We have two purposes for this training set. First, it is used to learn the DNN posterior model,
is the input to the DNN-layer l could be sigmoidal, an ReLU, or even a max-pooling layer of the DNN. Then, by feeding each of the training examples from class c, x (c) i , into the already trained DNN and extracting the layer l output vector for each such example, we can create a layer l derived feature vector training set conditioned on class c (with explicit notational dependence on l omitted for simplicity), that is,
Nc }, c = 1, . . . , K. For each such derived training 9 "Small" can be quantified, for example, by the squared norm of the perturbation vector falling below a given threshold.
set Z (c) , representative of class c, one can learn the class-conditional joint density, assuming a particular parametric density form and performing suitable model learning-for example, maximum likelihood estimation, coupled with model-order selection techniques such as Bayesian information criterion (Schwarz, 1978) , to estimate the model structure and "order" (e.g., the number of components, in the case of a mixture density).
Denote the resulting learned class-conditional densities for a particular layer of the DNN classifier by f Z|c (z|c), c = 1, . . . , K. These densities, over all layers being modeled, together constitute a null hypothesis model, where the null hypothesis is that a test vector z ∈ R d(l) is the result of feeding in an unperturbed image x from one of the K categories into the DNN and extracting the lth layer output of the DNN, ∀l. The alternative hypothesis, accordingly, is that z is the result of feeding an attacked (perturbed) image, call it x , into the DNN.
The Method from Feinman et al. (2017).
The AD proposed by Feinman et al. (2017) consists of the following operations, given a test pattern (image), x. First, determine the maximum a posteriori class under the DNN model:
() is the function whose input is x and whose output is the layer l output of the DNN. Third, evaluate f Z|c * (z|c * ) and declare an attack detection if this value is below a preset threshold. Feinman et al. (2017) used the penultimate layer of the DNN (the layer immediately preceding the decision layer, l = L − 1) and chose a simple gaussian kernel-based density estimator. We discuss these choices further below. However, without even considering these choices, we propose an improved detector, which fundamentally exploits much more information about a possible anomaly, to strong effect (as demonstrated by our results).
2.5
The Basic Proposed ADA Method. Consider a successful attack example-one that was obtained by starting from a "clean" example x from an (unknown) source class c s and then perturbing it until the DNN's decision on this perturbed example (now x ) is no longer c s , but is now c d = c s (the "destination" class). The premise behind the approach in Feinman et al. (2017) is that a test pattern z that results from feeding an attacked version of x, not x itself, into the DNN, will have an atypically low likelihood under the density model for the DNN-predicted class c d = c * . While we expect this may be true, if the perturbation of x is not very large, we might also expect that z will exhibit too much typicality (too high a likelihood) under some class other than c * , that is, under the source category, c s . It does not matter that the source category is unknown. We can simply determine our best estimate of this category, for example, asĉ s = arg max c∈{1,...,K}−c * f Z|c (z|c). Accordingly, we hypothesize that attack patterns should be both "too atypical" under c * and "too typical" underĉ s . This is illustrated in Figure 3 . While this may seem to entail an unwieldy detection strategy that requires use of two detection thresholds, we instead propose a single, theoretically grounded decision statistic that captures both requirements (jointly assessing the atypicality with respect to c * and the typicality with respect toĉ s ). Specifically, define a two-class posterior evaluated with respect to the (density-based) null model: ), that is, we declare a detection when this statistic exceeds a preset threshold value. Basic pseudocode for the resulting ADA procedure follows.
Model Learning
1. Learn the DNN classifier P DNN [C|x] using the given training set. 2. Estimate the class-conditional null densities f Z|c (), for all classes, c, for the specified layer, l, where Z = g l (X ).
ADA Inference
1. Given a test image x, compute the two-class posterior probability mass functions (pmfs) P and Q specified above. 2. For the given detection threshold τ , declare a detection if
If no detection is made, classify x using the maximum a posteriori rule applied to the DNN posterior
We note that KL divergence has been used in many works as an AD decision statistic, (Afgani, Sinanovic, & Haas, 2008; Xu, Denman, Fookes, & Sridharan, 2016; Miller, Ghalyan, & Ray, 2018) . In Xu et al. (2016) , KL is actually used in a supervised setting (to test between normal and abnormal class pmfs, with the abnormal class pmf estimated based on supervising information). In Afgani et al. (2008) , detections are made over time windows, with a pmf under the putative alternative hypothesis estimated using observations in the time window under consideration. Our application of KL divergence is within a purely unsupervised AD setting (labeled anomaly (attack) examples are not available for alternative model learning), unlike Xu et al. (2016) . Moreover, our method does not require online or timewindow-based estimation of a putative alternative hypothesis pmf, unlike Afgani et al. (2008) . Finally, our use of KL does not require explicitly forming an alternative hypothesis pmf; our KL is evaluated over pmfs defined on the classes in a supervised classification problem, with the class pmf evaluated in two ways: (1) using the DNN classifier's posterior and (2) using class-conditional null distributions derived from the DNN's deep feature layers. This allows us to have a single (KL-based) decision statistic that simultaneously assesses being "too atypical" with respect to one class (the attacker's destination class) and "too typical" with respect to another class (the attacker's putative source class). While we are not claiming high novelty of this approach, we have not seen KL used before for AD in the fashion we propose here.
Note that one of several possible interpretations for the asymmetric roles of P and Q in D KL (P||Q) is that P represents the "true" posterior, with Q an alternative model posterior whose agreement with the true is what we would like to assess. We place the null model posterior estimate in the "true" position because we believe it better reflects actual class uncertainties in a test pattern x than does the DNN posterior. There is some empirical evidence for this in our experiments. Moreover, we have found that this choice leads to better AD prediction power than what one gets by exchanging the roles of P and Q (and also modestly better than what one obtains using a symmetric version of KL divergence).
We emphasize that our hypothesis that an attacked pattern will exhibit both "too high atypicality" (with respect to c * ) and "too high typicality" (with respect toĉ s ) is not based on any strong assumptions about the attacker. It merely assumes that the perturbation is constrained to be small. This constraint, in conjunction with the attacked example's misclassification by the classifier, may necessitate that the test pattern will exhibit unusually high likelihood for a category (c s ) other than that decided by the DNN. It may also necessitate that the test pattern will exhibit unusually low likelihood under c * . (The perturbation is not large enough to make the perturbed image a typical pattern of c * .)
ADA Improvements

Layer and Null Model Choices.
We investigate gaussian mixture models (GMMs) for layers with full (positive and negative) support. As a novel contribution, we also propose log-normal multivariate mixture density modeling for RELU activation layers to reflect the fact that the RELU has unbounded nonnegative support. This involves log-transforming all features in the layer and then applying GMM to these transformed features. For an ReLU, applying the log() yields deep layer features with full (positive and negative) support (consistent with the full support of the GMM). Experimentally, we have found this yields performance gains over gaussian kernel and more general GMM joint densities. By contrast, Feinman et al. (2017) directly modeled nonnegative deep layer features using gaussian kernel densities (a special case of GMMs), which have full (positive and negative) support. This suboptimally gives probability support to negative feature values, even though the ReLU features are nonnegative; layers with full support (e.g., a hyberbolic tangent) can be directly modeled via GMMs. We also investigate several different layers, l ∈ {2, 3, . . . , L − 1}, for extraction of feature vectors.
Maximizing KL over Different Layers.
Rather than restricting to a single layer, for a given test image x, one can measure the KL divergence at multiple layers and choose, as the decision statistic, the maximum KL divergence over the different layers. This enhances detection performance, as anomalous signatures may not always prominently manifest in the same (e.g., penultimate) layer. We refer to this as ADA-maxKL. We will report how frequently different layers (close to the image input, or close to the DNN output) are the "winner" in our results.
Considering All Classes.
Instead of just considering c d and c s , it is also possible to form probability vectors for P and Q over all classes. While our detector's underlying hypothesis suggests that most of the anomalous signature may manifest with respect to c d and c s , more information may be exploited by considering all classes, especially if some classes are similar to each other. However, experimentally we have not found this paradigm to yield significant performance benefits.
Exploiting Uncertainty about c s and Knowledge of Class Confusion.
ADA as defined so far makes a hard decision estimate of the source class, c s . Alternatively, we can estimate the probability that C s = c (with dependence on z omitted for concision) via . 10 This weighting increases the contribution to the decision statistic for pairs unlikely to occur due to normal (nonattack) classifier confusion. Combining both these ideas, we construct the average, weighted ADA (AW-ADA) statistic for a given layer as
where
. Moreover, this can be evaluated for different layers, with the decision statistic its maximum over all considered layers. This is dubbed AW-ADAmaxKL. As will be seen, this approach achieves significant improvement in detection accuracy over the basic ADA method and over Feinman et al. (2017) , especially on the CIFAR-10 data set.
A Local Version of AWA-ADA-maxKL.
Instead of modeling the joint feature vector for a layer, we can comprehensively model low-order feature collections-in particular, all feature pairs. This is a rich low-order feature representation; for example, for a layer l with 400 features, there are N l = (400 choose 2) feature pairs that will be individually modeled. For each such feature pair, (Z i , Z j ), for each layer being modeled, one can separately form the AW-ADA KL-based statistic. Moreover, each such feature pair's AW-ADA statistic can be weighted based on the magnitude of the DNN weights from these features (Z i and Z j ) to the next layer of the DNN. (Higher-magnitude DNN weights indicate the feature pair (Z i , Z j ) is important for class decision making and that its AW-ADA statistic should be given stronger influence than pairs with lower-magnitude DNN weights.) Accordingly, for each layer, we form a weighted aggregation of all loworder AW-ADA statistics, expressed for layer l as L − AWA − ADA (l) :
We then choose, as the decision statistic, the maximum of this quantity over all layers l being modeled. Here, P (c)
which depends on the feature pair (z i , z j ), while
and is not a function of (i, j). Also, here, β i is the sum of the magnitudes of the DNN weights that conduct from feature i in layer l to all neurons in the next layer, l + 1, normalized by the maximum such sum over all features in layer l. Note also the normalization by the number of feature pairs in layer l, N l . This is done so that in maximizing L-AWA-ADA (l) over all layers l, there is a fair comparison of the statistics produced by each of the layers (which may have different numbers of features). Finally, note that we have omitted dependence on layer l in the LW-AWA-ADA (l) expression (except in the N l term) for concision of expression. We dub the resulting method L-AWA-ADA-maxKL, with L for "local." The motivation for this approach is that atypicalities may manifest on a very small subset of the features in a layer. If one null-models the joint feature vector for a layer with many features, atypicalities in just a few features may yield only very weak assessed joint feature atypicality. On the other hand, a high degree of atypicality will be assessed for a low-order feature collection that contains the strongly atypical features. This approach is inspired by the active learning-based class discovery framework in Qiu et al. (2016) , where it was found that comprehensively modeling low-order null densities leads to excellent detection of anomalies (unknown classes) with small footprints (only a few abnormal features, among many measured ones). This approach will be seen to be our ultimate, preferred ADA method, giving the overall best results, with large gains over other ADA variants in some cases.
Experimental Results
We have evaluated our proposed ADA detection method variants in comparison with a variety of published detectors, considering several image databases, several attack strategies, and a few different experimental scenarios.
Data Sets.
We experimented on the MNIST (LeCun, Cortes, & Burges, 1998a) and CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 (Krizhevsky, 2010) data sets. MNIST is a 10-class data set with 60,000 gray-scale images, representing the digits 0 through 9. CIFAR-10 is a 10-class data set with 60,000 color images, consisting of various animal and vehicle categories. CIFAR-100 is a 100-class data set with 60,000 color images. All three data sets consist of 50,000 training images and 10,000 test images, with all classes equally represented in both the training and test sets. For AD purposes, the data batch under consideration in our experiments consists of the test images plus the crafted attack images (whose generation we discuss below).
Classifiers.
For training deep neural networks, we used minibatch gradient descent with a cross-entropy loss function and a minibatch size of 256 samples. For MNIST, we trained the LeNet-5 convolutional neural net (LeCun, Cortes, & Burges, 1998b ). This neural net reaches an accuracy of 98.1% on the MNIST test set. For CIFAR-10, we used the 16-layer deep neural network architecture proposed in He, Zhang, Ren, and Sun (2016) and also used in Carlini and Wagner (2017b) . This neural net, once trained, reaches an accuracy of 89.47% on the CIFAR-10 test set.We also used the ResNet-18 architecture for CIFAR-10 in transferability experiments in the sequel, reaching an accuracy of 91.35%. For CIFAR-100, we used the ResNet-18 architecture and reach an accuracy of 81.73% on the CIFAR-100 test set.
Attacks.
During the phase of crafting adversarial samples, we perturbed only test set samples that were correctly classified. This is plausible since the attacker (who has full knowledge of the classifier, and thus whether a sample is correctly or incorrectly classified by the classifier) is not likely to attack a sample that the classifier is already misclassifying. We implemented the fast gradient step method (FGSM) attack (Goodfellow et al., 2015) and the Jacobian-based saliency map attack (JSMA) on the image data sets. We also evaluated the CW attack using the authors' supplied code (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b) . FGSM and CW are global methods, making small-magnitude perturbations, but to all pixels in the image. By contrast, JSMA is a more localized attack, making changes to far fewer pixels, but with large changes needed on these pixels in order to induce misclassifications. For CW, we used the version that quantifies image distortion using the L2 metric, since we found this was the most challenging CW version against which to defend. For JSMA, we implemented the version that alters a minimal set of dark pixels, making them white. Moreover, while JSMA was developed only in for gray-scale images and applied only to MNIST there, we extended their method to attack color images (CIFAR-10) by allowing perturbations of individual color planes, for each pixel, with a maximum on the total number of such perturbations. Again, perturbation of a pixel's color plane involved saturating to the maximum value.
For each test sample, from a particular class (e.g., c), we randomly selected one of the other classes (e.g., c ), in an equally likely fashion and generated an attack instance starting from the test image, using the given attack algorithm, such that the classifier will assign the perturbed image to class c . In this way, for MNIST, we successfully crafted 9845 adversarial images using the JSMA attack (its maximum percentage of pixels allowed to be perturbed is set to 13.75%), 9762 adversarial samples using the FGSM attack (its step size for gradient descent set to 0.0005), and 9894 adversarial images using the CW-L 2 attack (its Lagrange multiplier hyperparameter set to 3). For CIFAR-10, for the FGSM attack, we successfully crafted 9243 adversarial images (step size for gradient descent of 0.001); for the JSMA attack, we successfully crafted 9491 adversarial images (maximum percentage of pixel color planes allowed to be perturbed of 17.24%); for the CW attack, we successfully crafted 9920 images (Lagrange multiplier set to 4).
Some attack examples are shown for FGSM, JSMA, and CW attacks on MNIST in Figures 4 to 6. Note that while FGSM is generally thought of as an imperceptible attack, there are ghost artifacts in Figure 4 that are visually perceptible. For CW, there are also ghost artifacts, especially horizontally oriented, that are noticeable (see Figure 6 ). For CIFAR-10, though, we did indeed find FGSM and CW attacks to be visually imperceptible. JSMA attacks are quite visually perceptible in Figure 5 ; there are extra white pixels and also visible salt and pepper noise. Thus, while JSMA does induce misclassifications, it is arguable whether the attack is fully successful in the sense defined in in that the resulting images do have significant artifacts that might cause a human being to misclassify the attacked image in some cases, to profess "I don't know," or to suspect image tampering. This is especially true for some images starting from the 5 and 3 categories.
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We will also show how effectively our detector works under different attack strengths. For each attack, different parameters are varied to control the attack strength. For JSMA, we vary the maximum number of pixels allowed to be modified for an image; for FGSM, we vary the step size used in gradient descent (a larger step may allow the attack to move further beyond the classifier's decision boundary); for CW, we vary the Lagrange multiplier that controls the L2 difference between the original and attacked images.
We evaluate the success rate in crafting misclassified images, detection performance, and classification accuracy at a fixed true-positive detection rate, all as a function of attack strength.
Finally, we also include a white box attack experiment-the most challenging for our detector-where the attacker has full knowledge of both the classifier and the detector.
Baseline Detectors.
We implemented the unsupervised null density detector from Feinman et al. (2017) and the blurring "correction" approach from Li and Li (2017) . We used the code provided by the authors for the Openmax detector (Bendale & Boult, 2015) . We also compare with results reported for the 10 detectors evaluated in Carlini and Wagner (2017a) , especially against the CW attack.
Noisy Data Scenario.
The MNIST data is fairly "clean": the images are gray scale, but many pixels are nearly white or nearly black. In order to model the scenario where the data are messier, involving both evasive and natural adversaries (and thus where attack detection may be more challenging), we also performed experiments where gaussian noise was added to image intensity values. For the case of FGSM attacks, noisy images were obtained by adding gaussian noise to every pixel, with the mean and variance chosen to match the mean and variance of the perturbations produced by the FGSM attack. For the case of JSMA attacks, the same approach was applied (using the mean and variance estimated for the JSMA attack), but on a randomly chosen subset of pixels whose size was chosen to equal the number of pixels modified by the JSMA attack. In this way, for both attacks, (noisy) nonattack images are generated that are more difficult to distinguish from attack images than the orginal (clean) nonattack images.
For experiments involving noisy images, the experimental protocol was as follows. First, we designed classifiers and crafted attack images for the clean data set. Next, after estimating the mean and variance of the attack perturbations, we added noise to the training set. We then retrained the classifier and estimated the class-conditional null densities based on the noisy training set. We then crafted new attack images working from the original test images, which is required because the attack images should be successful in causing misclassification on the new classifier (trained on the noisy training images). Finally, noise is added to the original test samples, creating noisy (nonattacked) test samples. 12 The noisy test samples and the new attack samples form the batch on which anomaly detection is performed. In the case of CIFAR-10, since the color images are intrinsically noisy, we do not add any noise. All CIFAR-10 experiments were thus based on the original training and test images.
3.6 Null Density Modeling. For modeling null densities for several deep layers, we considered both the gaussian kernel density estimator used in Feinman et al. (2017) , gaussian mixture models (GMMs), and multivariate log-normal mixtures as described in the previous section. The number of mixture components was chosen for GMMs and the log-normal mixtures to minimize the Bayesian information criterion. For the gaussian kernel density, the variance parameter was chosen to maximize likelihood on the training set. For the GMM and log-normal mixtures, we considered both full covariance matrices and diagonal covariance matrices, depending on the dimensionality of the DNN layer being modeled. Table 1 shows the layerdependent GMM modeling choices we made. Note that Lenet-5 has one max-pooling layer, and the 16-layer neural net has 2 max-pooling layers.
Anomaly Detection Scenarios.
In our experiments, we investigated three different experimental scenarios in the black box case, where the attacker does not have knowledge of the detector: 3.7.1 Clean Case. We do not craft any noisy samples. The training phase is based on the original training set, and the test batch for AD consists of the original test samples and the crafted adversarial samples. All the experiments for CIFAR-10 were done under this case.
Noisy Case.
The experimental protocol for this case was previously discussed. The test batch for AD in this case consists of noisy versions of the original test samples (essentially, natural adversaries) and crafted adversarial samples that induce misclassifications by the classifier that was trained on the noisy training set. Note that the detection problem is expected to be more difficult here, compared with the clean case, as will be borne out by our results.
Mismatch Case.
Noisy is only added to the original test samples, while training is still based on the original (clean) training set. In this case, we included in the AD test batch the original (clean) test images, the noisy test images, and the adversarial images. Because the classifier and null modeling are based on clean data, whereas noisy data are included in the AD test batch, we refer to this as the mismatched case. This case is useful for assessing system robustness, when training and test conditions are statistically mismatched. Table 2 shows results on MNIST under the FGSM attack. In the first three columns, we only null-modeled the penultimate layer of the DNN. For ADA-maxKL (applied in the noisy case), maxKL is based on two layers: the single maxpooling layer and the penultimate layer. Note that all the methods work very well for the clean MNIST data set, but with ADA-GMM giving the best results and a highly compelling 0.992 AUC (including a point with (TPR, FPR) = (0.94, 0.03)). For the noisy case, the maxKL paradigm, considering anomalies in two different layers, is needed to get the best results for ADA. This method significantly improves over the other ADA methods (except AWA-ADA-maxKL and L-AWA) and over (Feinman et al., 2017) , achieving 0.957 AUC (and a point with (TPR, FPR) = (0.91, 0.06)). For the mismatch case, our basic ADA-kernel method, which exploits null information from both c d and c s , is seen to substantially outperform (Feinman et al., 2017) , which only exploits information from c d . Here, L-AWA gives the best results.
Experiments Involving Several Anomaly Detection of Attacks (ADA) Variants.
We also note that since we propose to detect and then classify if there are no detections, our system changes the distribution of the nonattack samples being classified (only those not falsely detected as attacks), which could affect the accuracy of the classifier. However, we have found that at relatively modest FPRs (e.g., 5% or less), there are extremely modest changes in the classifier's (conditional) test set accuracy (based on the test set that excludes false detections). This is true for both MNIST and CIFAR-10. Related results are reported later.
Note that beyond exploiting c s and c d , it is possible to define probability vectors on the full complement of classes, with KL distance measured between these probability vectors. Table 3 shows the AUC difference between using just two classes (source and destination) and using all classes. In this case, we applied the ADA-kernel detector in penultimate layer modeling on the CIFAR-10 data set. In this experiment and, in general, anecdotally, we have found that the gains in going from use of c s and c d to use of all classes is typically modest, with the gains in going from use of just c d (Feinman et al., 2017) to use of both c s and c d often much greater. This validates the main idea of the ADA detection paradigm: that an attack example is expected to be "too atypical" with respect to c d and "too typical" with respect to c s . Thus, good AD performance should be achievable by exploiting anomaly signatures measured with respect to both c s and c d rather than just c d (Feinman et al., 2017) . Table 4 shows the results on the CIFAR-10 data set under the FGSM attack. AUCs are much lower than for MNIST. One possible reason is that the classes are much more confusable for CIFAR-10 (with only 0.89 test set accuracy) than for MNIST. However, the maxKL paradigm still gives substantial AUC gains over both (Feinman et al., 2017) and the basic single-layer ADA method. Moreover, the use of confusion matrix and source uncertainty information by AW-ADA-maxKL gives significant further improvement, going from 0.8756 up to 0.9235 AUC (including a point with (TPR, FPR) = (0.8, 0.1)).
The "ideal" row shows results for an experiment where the misclassified test samples are excluded from the AD test batch. While these samples cannot of course, be excluded in practice, the goal here is to understand whether most of the ADA-maxKL suboptimality on CIFAR-10 is attributable to misclassified test samples. While the AUC does increase under the ideal case, it is still well below 1.0 (and below L-AWA's AUC in the clean case).
For ADA-maxKL in the clean case in Table 4 , we modeled the penultimate layer using a GMM and modeled the remaining two max-pooling layers with a gaussian kernel. We also want to illustrate how different Table 5 : AUC Score on CIFAR-10 Data Set with FGSM Attack and ADA-maxKL. modeling choices for these layers affect performance. For concision, we use G as short for GMM and K as short for gaussian kernel, so K-K-G means the first two maxpooling layers are modeled using a gaussian kernel while the penultimate layer is modeled using a GMM. Table 5 indicates that how the penultimate layer is modeled has some, albeit a modest, effect on the detection accuracy on CIFAR-10.
3.9
Experiments with the JSMA Attacks on MNIST. Table 6 evaluates several methods on the JSMA attack applied to MNIST in the clean and noisy cases, with the maximum fraction of modified pixels set to 9%. Note that ADA models the joint feature vector for a layer, which is a function of the entire image. Thus, we would expect that ADA is most suitable for detecting global attacks, wherein many or most pixels in the image are modified. This is borne out by our very strong detection results on MNIST for FGSM attacks. JSMA, however, strongly restricts the number of modified pixels (but necessitates that gross changes be made to these pixels in order to succeed in inducing miclassifications). Accordingly, JSMA is a more "local" attack. Thus, we might expect ADA not to perform as well in detecting JSMA attacks as FGSM attacks. This is borne out in Table 6 , where AWA-ADA-maxKL manages a respectable 0.9397 AUC in the clean case (but not nearly the 0.992 AUC achieved in detecting FGSM attacks). However, this is not to say that JSMA attacks are intrinsically harder to detect. In fact, from the images in Figure 5 , we see that the JSMA attacks are quite discernible, with salt and pepper noise and extra white content, which should make them readily detectable by a simple but suitably defined detector. To demonstrate this, we constructed two very simple detectors for JSMA attacks. One forms the class-conditional (null) histogram on the number of white pixels in the image. To make a detection decision on a given image, one counts the number of white pixels, N w , identifies the class whose mean white count is closest to N w , and then computes a one-sided p-value at N w , based on the class's (null) histogram. This p-value is the decision statistic that is thresholded. This very simple detector achieves an AUC of 0.946 in the clean MNIST case, a bit better than ADA-maxKL.
To achieve even better results (specifically targeting the clean image case), we can simply count the number of disjoint white regions in the image. Clean MNIST digits typically consist of a single white region, where a region is defined as a collection of pixels that are "connected," with two white pixels connected if they are in the same first-order (eight-pixel) neighborhood and with the region defined by applying transitive closure over the whole image. By contrast, nearly all JSMA attack images have extra isolated white regions (associated with salt and pepper noise). Simply using the number of white regions in the image as a decision statistic yields 0.97 AUC in the clean MNIST case. This strong result for this very simple detector indicates the susceptibility of the JSMA attack to a simple AD strategy, even as the ADA approaches evaluated until now are not most suitable for this attack.
3.10
Comprehensive Results for L-AWA-ADA-maxKL. Two experimental results given so far motivate the need for our best detection approach, L-AWA-ADA-maxKL. First, AWA-ADA-maxKL achieves only 0.94 and 0.896 AUCs in the clean and noisy cases, respectively, for JSMA on MNIST. Second, Although we have not yet discussed CW attack results, against the CW attack on CIFAR-10, AWA-ADA-maxKL achieves 85% TPR at 28% FPR and 81% TPR at 23% FPR. While this is better than the best (TPR, FPR) pair results reported for 10 detection methods in Carlini and Wagner (2017a) L-AWA-ADA-maxKL will be seen to substantially improve on these results. Thus, in this section, we give a comprehensive performance evaluation for L-AWA-ADA-maxKL, including performance as a function of attack strength for L-AWA; comparison of L-AWA against several baseline detectors; comparison with the detection results reported in Carlini and Wagner (2017a) for the CW attack; results for a white box attack on L-AWA; and application to detecting reverse-engineering attacks.
As shown in Table 6 , L-AWA-ADA-maxKL achieves a quite compelling AUC of 0.9893 in the clean case and 0.9325 in the noisy case for JSMA on MNIST. Thus, L-AWA-ADA-maxKL substantially outperforms the AWA-ADA-maxKL results in Table 6 and even outperforms the region-counting detector. L-AWA in the clean case achieves a point with (TPR, FPR) = (0.91, 0.07). Moreover, for the FGSM attack on CIFAR-10, L-AWA achieves an AUC of 0.9265 in Table 4 , slightly better than that reported for AWA-ADAmaxKL. Figure 7 , on the yaxis, we plot L-AWA's ROC AUC, the attack success rate (rate of successful misclassifications), and the conditional classifier accuracy, evaluated only on the nonattack images that are not falsely detected, for a TPR of 0.8125; we fixed the TPR as the attack strength is varied, while the FPR varies with attack strength. These are plotted as a function of the average fraction of pixels modified on each image by JSMA, which is a function of the attack strength-the maximum allowed fraction for an image. Note that the attack success rate tends to increase with attack strength, as expected. But this makes the attack highly detectable: AUCs above 0.98 are achieved when the average modified fraction is 5% or above. Note also that the (conditional) classifier accuracy (which varies because the FPR varies with the attack strength) exhibits quite small variations over the range of explored attack strengths. Figure 8 shows the same types of curves as in Figure 7 for the FGSM attack on CIFAR-10, with the FGSM gradient's step size playing the role of attack strength. We see that none of the three curves shows a clear trend as the FGSM step size is varied. This is not so surprising, since the step size may only weakly control the attack "strength." As the step size increases, there may be some tendency to produce attacked images that go further past the classifier decision boundary than when the step size is smaller. However, this effect may be quite modest, which explains why the ROC AUC and attack success rate remain roughly flat as the step size is varied. We also report that at an FPR of 0.0845, 15.92% of misclassified images are (falsely) detected as attacks. Thus, the false detection rate is higher in the population of misclassified images than in the overall image population. This is plausible, as misclassified images may look more like attacked images than correctly classified images.
Varying Attack Strength for JSMA on MNIST. In
Varying Attack Strength for FGSM on CIFAR.
Varying Attack Strength for CW on CIFAR.
The third attack investigated is CW (Carlini & Wagner, 2017b ; see Figure 9 ). Here, the attack strength is controlled by a Lagrange multiplier that determines the average L2 distance between the original and attacked images. In this case, we chose eight Lagrange multiplier values, {0.5, 1, 2, 5, 10, 15, 25, 50}, with the L2 image distortion increasing with this attack strength parameter. For CW, just as for JSMA, there are clear trends as the attack strength is varied. In particular, both the attack success rate and the detection accuracy tend to increase with the Lagrange multiplier. For a Lagrange multiplier value of 0.5, the detection performance is poor (AUC = 0.7112), but the attack success rate is also quite low (0.3121). We also report that at an FPR of 0.1216, 19.27% of misclassified images are falsely detected as attack. Again, misclassified images are overrepresented in the population of false-positive images. This suggests prescreening misclassified images using Hendrycks and Gimpel (2017a) could help improve performance.
Comparison with Other Detection Approaches.
Here we compare L-AWA with two other detectors, given a fixed attack strength: the "correction-based" detector using image blurring from Li and Li (2017) and the Openmax detector (Bendale & Boult, 2015) . We also compare with results from Carlini and Wagner (2017a) . As mentioned earlier, Openmax requires setting two hyperparameters using labeled attack examples. Thus, this method is actually supervised. Figure 10 shows the performance of the three detectors against the FGSM attack on CIFAR-10. In this case, we used 137 adversarial images to determine the hyperparameters for the Openmax method. We can see that although the blurring method's detection performance is somewhat competitive with L-AWA, this is achieved with some compromise in the (conditional) classification accuracy as the attack FPR is varied. Openmax's detection accuracy is the worst, despite its use of quite a few labeled attack examples for setting its hyperparameters.
We also assessed the execution time required by methods to make detections. Currently we are using two NIVIDA GTX1080 GPUs, an Intel Core i7-5930K processor and a 256 GB DDR4. For this platform, detection time for a CIFAR-10 image using L-AWA is 0.00114 s and 0.00063 s for the blurring method; it is both quite modest and comparable for the two methods. For comparison, the average time required by the attacker to craft a successful CW attack example on CIFAR-10 (averaged over the whole test set) is 0.72 s-approximately 700 times that required for L-AWA detection. Thus, detector computational complexity is much lower than that of the attacker.
For the CW L2 attack (see Figure 11 ), we used 152 adversarial samples to determine the hyperparameters for Openmax. L-AWA greatly outperforms both baseline detectors in this experiment. Again, the blurring method compromises some classification accuracy as the FPR is varied. Finally, for the JSMA attack on CIFAR-10 (see Figure 12) , with the maximum number of modified pixel planes of 9.7%, we again see that L-AWA outperforms the two baseline methods, even though the JSMA attack on CIFAR-10 (unlike MNIST) is not so easy to detect for any of the methods. In this case, the Openmax method used 250 labeled attack images to set its hyperparameters. Also, in this case, the blurring method performs the worst.
Results for the CW Attack on CIFAR-10.
As noted earlier, the best approach reported in Carlini and Wagner (2017a) against CW was a supervised detection approach (Metzen et al., 2017) , achieving 81% TPR at a 28% FPR. 13 The unsupervised AW-ADA-maxKL detector (using GMM densities) achieves 85% TPR at 28% FPR and 81% TPR at 23% FPR. L-AWA (using multivariate log-normal mixture densities) achieves what we believe is a current state-of-the-art result against CW: 0.9257 AUC, 81% TPR at 12% FPR, and 96% TPR at 28% FPR-better than results reported in Carlini and Wagner (2017a) and also significantly better than AW-ADA-maxKL. Of course, there is still potentially room for further improvement, as this is far from perfect detection performance.
3.10.6 Deep Layer Atrribution. We also mention that for L-AWA-ADAmaxKL for the CW attack on CIFAR-10, all three modeled deep layers contributed significantly to the decision making. The first maxpooling layer was the winner 37% of the time, the second maxpooling layer won 40% of 13 Carlini and Wagner (2017a) report higher detection rates for a few other methods.
However, in these cases, FPR was not reported. the time, and the penultimate layer won 23% of the time (averaged over all detections for all three attacks).
3.11 L-AWA-ADA-maxKL against a Fully White Box Attack. We extend the white box attacker's objective function from Carlini and Wagner (2017a) , devising an attack to defeat both the classifier and the detector. Specifically, the attacker chooses the image perturbation δ seeking to solve min δ (||δ|| 2 + c · ( f (x + δ) + D(x + δ))). Here, f (·) and D(·) are loss functions as defined in Carlini and Wagner (2017a) , f (·) nonnegative when a correct classification is made and D(·) nonnegative when a detection is made, D(·) using knowledge of the detector's threshold on its decision statistic. This (additive) cost is minimized when a modestly perturbed image is both misclassified and not detected. The detector's FPR was set to 14%. The attacker cycles over the whole image, pixel by pixel, over all three color planes, using a perturbation step of 0.05. A perturbation is accepted if the cost function decreases. The construction is stopped when cost function changes fall below 10 −4 for two consecutive image passes. In Figure 13 , we plot the success rate in crafting misclassified images (the attack craft rate), the detector's ROC AUC, the fraction of successfully crafted images that are not detected (the conditional system defeat rate), and the fraction of attempted attacks that are both misclassified and not detected (the overall system defeat rate, the attacker's ultimate performance measure), all as a function of attack strength (L2 distortion). As in previous black box experiments, the attack craft rate and the attack's detectability (ROC AUC) increase with attack strength, with the attack strength varied up to a maximum craft rate of 0.9294. Looking at the conditional system defeat rate, there is an attack strength sweet spot of 2.5, where more than 40% of crafted images are not detected. However, less than 40% of attempted attacks cause misclassifications at this attack strength. The ultimate figure of merit, the system defeat rate, thus has a maximum value of about 0.25 at an attack strength of about 2.9; per white box attack attempt, the maximum attack success rate (defeating the classifier and detector) is about 25%. This is higher than in the black box case-the CW attack success rate in defeating L-AWA was 1 − 0.81 = 0.19 at 12% FPR-but only modestly so. Even with white box knowledge, it is not so easy to craft images to defeat both the classifier and (L-AWA) detector. Moreover, these attacks are much heavier computationally than the detection (or detection plus classification) effort.
Experiments on CIFAR-100.
We also evaluated the methods on CIFAR-100, again using the ResNet-18 DNN architecture. The only modification of L-AWA for this data set was not to perform inverse weighting by the confusion matrix, as the confusion matrix is not reliably estimated in the 100 class case. Again, OpenMax used 150 labeled attack examples to choose its hyperparameters. Figures 14 and 15 show that L-AWA significantly outperform the other detectors for both the CW and FGSM attacks. Moreover, while L-AWA's ROC AUC is lower than for CIFAR-10 (as might be expected), it is still above 0.9.
Transferability Experiments.
We also investigated attack transferability between different classifiers. In this case, the attacker (assumed not to know the true classifier) used a ResNet-8 network to craft adversarial samples, with the true classifier using a ResNet-18 network. In this (targeted) scenario, an adversarial sample is counted as a successful attack if and only if it is misclassified to the target class by both classifiers. We evaluated the different detectors' performances for this transferability scenario. For both the FGSM and CW attacks on CIFAR-10 and the CW attack on CIFAR-100, shown in Figures 16, 17, and 18 , respectively, L-AWA considerably outperforms OpenMax and Blurring. For the CIFAR-100 case, L-AWA's ROC AUC is not very good: only 0.8662. However, the detection accuracy is still much better than the comparison methods. We also note that the targeted success rate of the attack is only 57% for CW on CIFAR-100; targeted transferability rates are not as high as untargeted transferability rates (where one only needs to induce a misclassification).
3.14 Experiments on Detection of Reverse-Engineering Attacks. We investigated detection of the reverse engineering (RE) attack from Papernot et al. (2017) , which is summarized as follows. First, the adversary collects a small set of representative labeled samples from the input domain as an initial training set S 0 and uses this to train an initial substitute classifier. Then there is stagewise data collection and retraining, over a sequence of stages. In each, the adversary augments the current training set by querying the classifier with the stage's newly generated samples,
where k is the current stage index and P (k) s [C = c|x] is the current substitute class posterior model. The substitute classifier is then retrained using S k+1 . Each successive stage crafts samples closer to the classifier's true boundary, which is helpful for RE learning but also makes these samples less class representative and thus more detectable. Once a sufficiently accurate surrogate classifier is learned, the adversary can launch a test-time evasion (TTE) attack, using, for example, Goodfellow et al. (2015) , , or Carlini and Wagner (2017b) .
Since, in RE attacks, the attacker submits numerous query images to the classifier at each stage, we modified L-AWA to jointly exploit batches of images from a common stage in seeking to detect attacks (in this case, RE query attacks, not TTE attacks). To aggregate L-AWA-ADA decision statistics, produced for individual images in a batch, we first divided a batch into minibatches; for example, a batch of 50 images could be divided into minibatches of size 5. Next, for each minibatch, we maximized the L-AWA statistic over all images in the minibatch. Finally, we make a detection if any of the minibatches yields a detection statistic greater than the threshold.
We experimented on MNIST and CIFAR-10, using the CW TTE attack. For MNIST, as a DNN classifier, we used Lenet-5. We also used the Lenet-5 structure for training the RE attacker's substitute network. For S 0 we used 150 MNIST samples (15 from each class). We applied five stages of retraining (six training stages) of the substitute DNN, using gradient descent with λ = 0.1. The number of queries generated by the five stages were 150, 300, 600, 1200, and 2400. We used minibatches of size 5 in experiments. Two maxpooling layers and the penultimate layer were used in generating the L-AWA detection statistics. Figure 19 shows that detection accuracy increases with both the query stage and the batch size, as expected. At query stage 6 (before a very good surrogate classifier has been reverse-engineered), for a batch size of 50, the ROC AUC based on L-AWA is greater than 0.97. Figure 20 shows the TTE Figure 16 : CW attack transferability experiment on CIFAR-10. surrogate classifier's accuracy versus the RE query stage and also the TTE attack success rate if RE stops after a particular query stage. We focused on stages 4, 5, and 6 in our RE experiments because the TTE attack success rate is higher at these stages.
For CIFAR-10, as a DNN classifier, we used ResNet-18. We also used the same structure for training the RE attacker's surrogate network. For S 0 we used 280 CIFAR-10 samples (28 from each class). We applied six stages of retraining (seven training stages) of the surrogate DNN, using gradient descent with λ = 0.37. The number of queries generated by the six stages were 280, 560, 1120, 2240, and 4480. We used minibatches of size 5 in experiments. Two maxpooling layers and the penultimate layer were used in generating the L-AWA detection statistics. Figures 21 and 22 show the detector's and attacker's performances for different query stages. For CIFAR-10, the surrogate classifier's accuracy and the TTE attack success rate are not very high, even after stage 7. The L-AWA-based RE detector achieves high ROC AUC, above 0.97, as the batch size is increased, for query stages 6 and 7.
These results demonstrate that our L-AWA framework can not only be used as a promising TTE detector, but also to detect RE attacks that may be used to enable TTEs. Thus, detection can be used to defeat a TTE at either the precursor (RE) attack stage or during the TTE attack.
Discussion and Future Work
While our approach exploits deep layer attack signatures in DNNs, there are also recent attacks that effectively seek to destroy such signatures (beyond approaches such as that of Li and Li, 2017) . The attack in Sabour, Cao, Faghri, and Fleet (2016) was not explicitly designed to induce (imperceptible) misclassifications. Rather, it was to make imperceptible changes to an image, X, such that the representation in layer l, g l (X + ) will be very similar to the representation g l (X ) for a different image, X . If the images X and X come from two different classes, the resulting perturbation may induce the classifier to misclassify the perturbed image to the class of the target image. In principle, this could form the basis for a good gray box attack, simply exploiting knowledge of which DNN layers are used for AD and applying the attack to those layers. However, this attack was not successful on either MNIST or CIFAR-10 (Sabour et al., 2016) . This is actually not so surprising; it is very stringent to force an internal (deep) layer for the perturbed image to agree closely with a different (target) image's representation of that layer; the two representations need not necessarily be very similar to induce a misclassification. That is, forcing such agreement may cause misclassifications, but the required perturbations may need to be much larger than those required for attacks with objectives more directly related to misclassification such as Goodfellow et al. (2015) , , and Carlini and Wagner (2017b) . However, some variation on Sabour et al. (2016) , better matched to the misclassification objective, could potentially form a challenging gray box attack.
Although our approach is unsupervised, we could investigate a supervised variant that uses our local ADA-AWA statistics as input features to a classifier that is trained on some known attacks and tested on held-out unknown attacks. This may also be investigated in future.
While we have focused on DNN classifiers, our approach is suitable more generally to complement other classifiers in detecting test time attacks. Also, we have considered only image classification domains. Our approach should be suitable for other domains such as speech recognition (Carlini et al., 2016) or music genre classification (Kereliuk, Sturm, & Larsen, 2015) . Here, the feature vector might not be the raw data (speech waveform); it might be cepstral or wavelet coefficients. Accordingly, the null density models may need to be well customized for the domain in order to give the strongest attack detection results. Moreover, our approach can also be readily applied when features are categorical, ordinal, or mixed continuous-discrete. For discrete feature spaces (e.g., a text domain, where the attacker is seeking to imperceptibly modify a document to fool a document or email classifier), null density functions would need to be replaced by sufficiently rich joint probability mass function null models.
